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Thinking of hydro as a staple is a little like assuming that a whale is a big fish.  
They share great similarities, but also posess significant differences.  Hydro, thought of 
as “water power” is a resource that has been important for Canada’s economic and social  
development, and hydro mega-projects themselves also have many “staples like” 
features. Once water power was used to run grist mills and motor machinery. But since 
the late nineteenth century the term ‘hydro’ usually referred to the water power as 
renewable resource used to generate electricity, one of the most important modern forms 
of energy. Indeed, Canadians often interchange the words hydro and electricity. But 
neither water nor hydroelectricity is produced primarily for export markets, though 
energy can be a significant part of the value of other resources and manufactured items 
heading for export. For these reasons, Dales (1957) considered hydro a “quasi staple.”   
Hydroelectric systems are prone to the classic staples problem of excess capacity.  
Additionally, economic rents and linkages integral to staples analysis are also 
extraordinarily important to hydro. Simply put, the high costs of hydro mega-projects and 
infrastructure means that utilities experience inordinately high financial costs while 
market demand is still low—and conversely can make signifcant returns when markets 
grow to utilize the full capacity of a system.  To address this problem, electricity 
producers, were at the forefront of making economic strategies that cultivate energy 
consumption.  
Hydroelectric technology is quite efficient, though it necessitates significant 
change and management of the sociopshere. Dams,  reservoirs,  river diversions, control 
works and the mitigative engineering that goes with them are all are one aspect of 
hydroelectricity’s ecological footprint.   Another is the complex network of transmission 
and distribution lines connecting production to point of use. Electricity networks are not 
like a train or pipeline in which a particular resource is shipped from point A to point B.  
Rather a network or grid is actually a balancing act in which managers balance the energy 
at one point with the loss of energy at other points.  Since electricity can not be stored 
(except in the form of water reservoirs or alternative fuels), grids need constant 
management to meet daily and seasonal peaks and troughs of demand.  
These structural characteristics of hydroelectric systems were translated into 
thinking of them as highly politicized natural monopolies. We shall see below that these 
systems have changed over time, as they have been governed by three succeeding policy 
regimes,  a formative mixed regime, postwar provincial hydros and megaprojects regime 
and lastly an emerging sustainability/regionalization regime.  
 
The Origins of Electricity Generation and Transmission in Canada to 1945 
Canada’s formative hydro paradigm was geared towards producing energy for 
industry and urban modernization.  Indeed, according to John Dales, H. V. Nelles and 
Christopher Armstrong, the leading historians in this field, the “story” surrounding the 
formative electrical energy policy regimes was the struggle over the control and use of 
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hydro from the late 19th century through to the second world war. The result was a mixed 
regime of private and public, primarily municipal utlities, save in the case of Ontario. 
Decisions on public ownership during this period depended, among other things, on the  
ideology of government elites, characteristics of public power movements, the strength 
and cohesiveness of utility capital, the fiscal resources of governments, 
intergovernmental relations and the relative resource scarcity. (Dales 1957; Nelles 1974, 
Armstrong 1981; Armstrong and Nelles 1983.1986).    
The first major electricity networks were defined by urban regions, and as hydro 
resources were developed these networks were also involved in regional industrialization.  
In Quebec the abuandance of hydro resources led utilities to advance the industrial 
development of hydro rich regions such as the Saguenay (Dales 1957). In more remote 
regions, industrial producers emerged that developed hydro resources for local mines, 
pulp and paper and later, aluminum smelting. The end result was a fragmented set of 
electricy networks.  The operating assumption was regional network self reliance–
meaning that each network stood on its own or that the relationships between them were 
ad hoc rather than systemic.   
The ecological footprint of early hydro regimes was concentrated on rivers (and 
their associated drainage systems) that were close to the urban populations.  Some of 
them, such as the Niagara, Winnipeg and Ottawa Rivers, were part of international and 
interprovincial boundaries and drainage basins. Remote hydro resources could not be 
exploited for urban networks because long distance transmission technologies were 
relatively inefficient. Initially hydro investments were ad hoc, but with time the planning 
and conservation regimes played a larger role in determining the most rational and 
efficient use of resources, and thus capital. Provincial governments played a key role in 
shaping these conservation strategies through a licencing procedure. While the rights to 
hydro resources were first sold as private property, over time provincial governments 
instituted a rentier regime by claiming ownership of these resources and then licencing 
their use in return for a form of royalty.  Investment was sequenced through the timing 
and terms of licences.  
Canada and the United States established an enduring process for binational 
resource conservation and dispute resolution. The 1909 Canada-United States Boundary 
Waters Treaty established the International Joint Commission (IJC), itself a framework to 
provide equal rights in boundary water resources and a consensual binational process for 
settling disputes.  The IJC then provided the framework to establish conservation boards 
to ensure the equitable sharing of hydro resources for Niagara Falls (the lynchpin of early 
Ontario energy policy), the Lake of the Woods, Rainy and Winnipeg River System 
(central to the Manitoba energy strategy). In time the IJC process spread to all boundary 
waters.  
Ottawa did not have the same success in shaping interprovincial conservation 
regimes or a national electricity policy. Christopher Armstrong (1981) details how during 
this whole period the constitutional jurisdiction of hydro was ambiguous, leaving the 
determination of federal and provincial roles more to the play of politics than the 
constitution. Though provinces generally claimed ownership of resources and crown 
lands, hydro resources were not enumerated in the constitutional division of powers. 
Ottawa had clear responsibilities for fisheries and navigation, even in inland waters, and 
also powers to regulate international and interprovincial trade. Ottawa, as well,            
managed the water resources of the three prairie provinces until until 1930. But the 
waning years of the National Policy were also a nadir of federal power. Indeed, when 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s Liberal government attempted to outline a federal role 
in hydro (aside from the then federal control over resources in the prairie provinces), 
Liberal MPs from both Québec and Ontario, as well as their respective provincial 
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governments, opposed the initiative.  Even a constitutional reference did not clarify the 
issues or set out a clear federal-provincial division of tasks in the field.  
Eventually,  Ottawa’s national electricity policy centred on protecting hydro for 
domestic markets by discouraging long term exports. Ottawa did not have the political 
power to establish interprovincial water conservation agreements or regulate 
interprovincial trade in electricity. Nor could it bring Ontario and Quebec together with 
the US Government for agreement on how to develop the hydro capacity of the Saint 
Lawrence River.  Protecting hydro for the domestic market really meant protecting it for 
provincial purposes.  Hydro regimes were effectively centred in provincial capitals. Even 
in the prairie provinces, federal hydro planning and licencing would need the consent of 
the junior provinces. Interprovincial electricity trade policy became a matter of voluntary 
agreements or contracts between provinces.  
Provincial hydro regimes did, however, have substantial economic impact. 
Electricity networks spread throughout urban Canada and a “cheap power policy” was 
used to fuel industrialization, social and technological modernization.  Peter Wylie 
(1990) estimates that the technological adaptation and restructuring of Canadian 
manufacturing during the 1900-1929 period led to an over five fold increase in 
production and to significant decreases (up to 15 percent ) in manufacturing costs (Wylie 
1990). Certainly, the 1929-39 depression and subsequent world war acted as 
“perturbations” that substantially affected the development of the formative energy 
paradigm. The only complete failure of a hydro utility during the period, for example, 
occurred in Manitoba when the collapse of key industrial markets forced Winnipeg 
Electric, the Nesbitt-Thomson affiliate and the province’s major private utility, into 
“financial reorganization” (Netherton 1993).  
John Dales (1957) chronicled the efforts of the five regional Québec monopolies 
to foster industrialization, and came to the  conclusion that the  unfettered monopolies 
had stifled the economic development of the province.  At issue were the high rates that 
weakly regulated monopolies charged urban domestic consumers, as opposed to the 
cheap commercial and industrial rates offered business, a defacto tax that Dales 
considered a drag on the economy. The regulatory issue was important because although 
Canadian political culture was more accepting of regulation than that of the United 
States, the actual form of regulation was generally not particularly effective (Currie 1946; 
Dupré and Party 1998). Dales was also critical of the complacency of the Montréal 
monopoly’s with respect to Saint Lawrence hydro resources, energy Dales thought would 
have substantially aided in the development of the region. Research suggests similar 
problems on the Prairies where the lack of surplus power in Manitoba during the war 
hindered war-related industrialization and economic development (Netherton 1993). 
Indeed, during the war all provinces would be under pressure to renew investment in 
electrical energy infrastructure.   
Lastly, these formative regimes institutionalised social inequality, particularly 
between rural and urban society.  The latter had the population density that made their 
inclusion within electrical networks economically viable for public and private utilities.  
But the low density of rural populations and especially the lack of agricultural income on 
the Prairies during the 1930s made rural electrification conventionally impossible.  
 
The Development of Provincial Hydro Monopolies and Their Decline  1946-1990  
After facing depression and war effort exigencies, when public leadership 
thought of postwar energy needs, they began to see the role of the state in more 
systematic and social terms than previously.  The new overall policy objective was not 
the pursuit of and control over electrification, but to ensure that sufficient investment 
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could be made to meet postwar needs, and to ensure equity among the various 
fragmented electrical networks.  The emerging energy policy paradigm conformed to 
Keynesian-welfare state principles, or the Canadian technocratic variety (Campbell 1957)  
in that it necessitated a massive state assisted investment program for electrical energy 
and, at the same time, the systematic continuation of promotional rates. This broader  
“cheap power” policy subsidized and facilitated the mass production and consumption of 
electrical goods, a system of production and economic regulation often termed ‘Fordism’.  
So began the era of ‘mega-projects’ and ‘provincial hydros’.  
Focussing on Canada’s ‘permeable’ Fordism (Jenson  1989. 1990. 1993) has 
important consequences for the analysis of Canada’s postwar energy strategy and the role 
hydroelectricity played in it.   A.W. Currie’s (1946) postwar review of Canadian utility 
regulation makes the point. In Ontario (the province with the most developed electricity 
market),  the cost of appliances, not the cost of electricity, had become the impediment to 
the continued electrification of society. The viable corporate strategy for utilities, 
therefore, was to help cultivate the mass consumption of appliances.  It was not 
uncommon, for example, for public utilities to subsidize the cost of purchasing electric 
stoves, refrigerators and washing machines. In rural electrification programs utilities 
could even offer prospective customers a whole set of appliances in special five year 
financial packages (Netherton 1993). Eventually, popular utility demonstration programs, 
such as “live better electrically” were witness to the convergence of electricity policy to 
that of the mass production and consumption of electrical wares–from the energy 
guzzling big appliances to the transformation of “hand tools” into “power tools”. 2 
Once set in motion, the combination of cheap power and permeable Fordism, 
given continued economic growth, produced pressures that produced a “provincial 
hydros” and “mega-projects” regime.  With annual growth of energy demand between six 
and seven percent, utilities looked at doubling their capacity each decade.  Accordingly 
provincial utilities commenced massive coal, nuclear and hydro investment programs–
stretching provincial financial capacity to its limits.  
 The new public ownership model resembled the postwar British model of 
nationalized utility (Murphy 1952) or, if you will, the diffusion to other provinces of a 
modernized version of the Ontario Hydro model-a vertically integrated state-owned 
company that produced, transmitted and sometimes distributed electricity. Both the scale 
of the projected capital investments and the level of long-term risk associated with them 
necessitated substantive public involvement.  Provincial governments stepped in to plan 
and implement these investments. Why the provincial state? Private utility capital lost its 
leading role in the first regime.  There was no politically cohesive grouping of private 
utility capital to redefine the paradigm to include its long-term needs and the general 
thrust of creating provincial or public hydros’ had broad political support.  Private capital 
could not be the instrument to carry out an expanded program of investment, reorganize 
networks to eliminate inequities and at the same time, push the cheap power policy to its 
very limits. 3  
The ‘provincial hydros’ dominated the new policy regime.  Equipped with easy 
access to financial markets (as provincial governments guaranteed their bonds) they 
turned the regime into an investment machine.  Indeed, during the boom in public energy 
investment, the many hydro utilities had annual investment expenditures that rivalled that 
of the provincial governments that owned them. A second source of authority for the 
utilities in the policy regime was simply that they had monopoly over the technical 
expertise needed to manage the design and construction of the new energy systems. In 
particular, new developments in transmission technology were instrumental in 
incorporating remote hydro resources as sources for urban Canada’s energy needs.  When 
a federal policy initiative to create a national grid failed, Ottawa outlined a 1962 National 
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Power Policy that reversed the traditional domestic market protection by encouraging a 
‘prebuild strategy ‘in which provinces would develop large scale northern hydro projects 
for export so that they would be ready for Canadian demand as it occurred.   
Regime development occurred in stages. The provinces of Manitoba, Québec and 
British Columbia, as well as the new province of Newfoundland and Labrador became 
more concerned with planning and implementing long-term hydroelectric development  
strategies. This included taking over and integrating the fragmented local networks and 
intregrating them in wider provincial network and gradually investing in electricity 
generation capacity.  A second stage saw the major hydro provinces place existing private 
hydro producers under public ownership (Blais 1979, Froschauer 1999). There were 
exceptions. The private monopoly on the Island of Newfoundland kept its  monopoly, 
perhaps due to the fiscal and financial weakness of the former colony. A second major 
exception was that for the most part provincial governments did not take over the private 
industrial producers and in the case of Aluminum producers, allowed an expansion of 
private hydro development for industrial purposes, often isolated from the emerging 
provincial networks.  
In provinces without an abundance of energy or that relied on a mixture of fuels 
and technologies (hydro, thermal generation from coal, petroleum, natural gas and later 
nuclear power) such as Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan, the 
provincial energy policy regimes were variations of the universal postwar model, 
retaining their provincial boundaries and assumptions of provincial self reliance. Prince 
Edward Island, like Newfoundland, kept a local private monopoly and Alberta 
maintained the regionally based mixed system developed in the formative paradigm.  
 The closed nature of electrical energy policy regimes invited considerable 
confrontation from  social and environmental interests opposed to or negatively  affected 
by hydro mega-projects.  Of these, confrontation with Aboriginal peoples became the 
most pressing constraint on energy strategies.  Aboriginal peoples displaced by 
reservoirs, river diversions and other changes to the sociosphere attributable to hydro 
mega-projects were the one societal group targeted to pay most directly for energy 
strategies designed to benefit the majority. Protracted contestation emerged between First 
Nations and provincial governments over energy policies and regimes of compensation 
and mitigation.  Intially, Aboriginal communities were authoritatively “relocated.” In the 
early 1970s the James Bay Cree used the judiciary to force Premier Robert Bourassa’s 
Liberal Government to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of their claims during 
construction of the James Bay Hydro project.  A similar “negotiating” with a bulldozer in 
the back yard process occurred in Manitoba, resulting in the signing, in 1978 of the 
Northern Flood Agreement (Waldram 1988).  In these processes Aboriginal political 
movements and allies in Churches, the new left, nationalist and environmental groups, 
used domestic political and legal resources to open a crack in the notoriously closed and 
powerful hydro regimes.  
The representation environmental objectives in the policy regime was less 
immediately successful. Environmental impact assessments would emerge slowly and 
diffuse into provincial decision-making unevenly, but would concern a wider range of 
issues than provincial energy strategies had heretofore considered.  New environmental 
policy initiatives emerged as clearer legislative mandates and new regulatory regimes 
were put in place in major Canadian provinces   (Jaccard, Nyboer and Makinen 1991). 
Policy makers moved away from thinking about new energy supplies to thinking about 
the gains from better use of resources.  Vertically integrated utilities experimented with 
new policy concepts such as Integrated Resource Planning, and Demand Side 
Management (DSM) programs. For example, “Power Smart” and other conservation and 
energy efficiency programs initiated policies ranging from subsiding improvements in 
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housing technology, to the creation of energy efficiency standards for public lighting, 
electrical appliances and electronic components.   
In the 1980s utilities also experimented by seeding the use of more 
environmentally benign “green” technologies and encouraging non utility industrial 
producers of electricity, as well as small producers of electricity from more expensive 
alternative technologies, what is generally now termed an  “independent power producer” 
(IPP), to sell to major  utilities.  The policy logic was that  seeding small amounts of 
alternative supply technologies  into the supply at uneconomic prices would eventually 
lead to a significant diversity of supply.  The policy assumed that continually increasing 
energy prices would assure that the new energy supplies would eventually be  
economically viabile. Eventually, natural gas producers, relying upon a new and 
significantly more efficient and small scale combined cycle turbine technology, used 
provisions of the US legislation to gain a foothold in the electricity market, a process that 
took the pressure off utilities to purse mega-projects.  
The concept of sustainable development eventually replaced the Keynesian 
concept of abundant low cost energy, therefore linking competitive market efficiency and 
long-term environmental protection. Energy policy would change to meet post-industrial 
and gobal exigencies.  
 
The Sustainability/Regionalization Regime Post 1990 
During the 1980s economists and sociologists argued that the provincial hydro 
regime had lost its way.  For economists such as Jean Thomas Bernard and R.D Cairns 
(1987)  the inability of publically owned utilities to set prices at marginal costs meant that 
these regimes could not collect or redistribute rents efficiently while other economists, as 
well as sociologists and historians, argued that the regime was out of  control. (Cairns and 
Heyes 1993; Hargrove 1994; Mackay 1983; Tritschler 1979; Young 1982) 
By the 1990s, Canadian economists openly questioned the older paradigmatic 
assumptions. For example, Mark Jaccard (1995) argued the case for change by asking 
whether electricity ought still be considered an important public good, whether it’s 
production and distribution were natural monopolies and whether vertically integrated 
public utilities were an appropriate agent to carry out public objectives. In concluding the 
negative for each question, the case for complete change to the existing model was made.  
A related criticism was that public ownership of utilities led to overinvestment and 
economic waste, potentially the most important critique because it connected utility 
investment with the sustainable development and environmental policy objectives that 
emerged during the last decade. Glen P. Jenkins opened up a national debate on public 
ownership by arguing that the financial and tax advantages given to provincially owned 
public utilities created distortions and massive economic waste of the capital used to 
invest in them, a waste that ranged up to 60% of the cost of Canadian electricity (Jenkins 
1985). Though economists criticized his method, the extent of the distortion and 
alternative remedies, and defended the potential of provincially owned utilities as 
instruments to capture rents from hydro resources, no economist defended the paradigm 
at it was.  (Bernard and Cairns 1987; Jenkins 1987; Spiro 1987) 
What Jaccard and others argued for was the implementation of a new market 
based model, similar to that developed in the United Kingdom, in which utilties were 
broken down into separate producers, system (grid) opperators, and distributors and 
integrated by a legislated market. Many initiatives put in place to change the existing 
system were hotly contested.  (Cohen 2001; Cohen 2002; Dewees 2002; Dunksy and 
Raphals 1998; Plourde 2002) For example, Premier Clyde Wells attempted to  privatize 
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in 1994 as a means of forcing a renegotiation of the 
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Churchill Falls Power Contract, but backed down in face of mobilized opposition.   The 
Ontario government began utility market reform with a White Paper and the 1998 Energy 
Competition Act that would deintegrate and privatize the highly indebted crisis ridden 
formally provincial Hydro. The older nuclear facilities were mothballed and after a 
damming assessment of Ontario Hydro’s nuclear management performance, one of three 
nuclear complexes was leased to a British transnational energy firm.  In 2002, after 
several years of open contestation the government came to the brink of  privatization just 
as the new system began to operate.  However,  at the eleventh hour an anti-privatization 
coalition launched a successful legal challenge to the privatization legislation. Faced with 
prospects of remaking the privatization coalition, the Ontario government withdrew the 
initiative. The “market system” would be state owned  (Swift and Stewart 2005). 
Though older provincial hydros have been broken up to conform to the new 
model and there has been limited privatization of new supply, only one provincial hydro 
(Nova Scotia Power) has been privatized. Even in Alberta, Canada’s most “extreme” 
market experiment, there was no privatization of major generating utilities, and the new 
market includes both major municipal utilities, as well as IPPs, clearly a mixed system.   
Both jurisdictions that have gone to full market integration have also corrected initially 
volatile markets with forms of rebates, contract alternatives or other interventions to 
correct market failure.  Hence, Doern and Gattinger label it a “managed” competition 
which seeks to establish workable systems, not unfettered markets (Doern and Gattinger 
2003).   
The introduction of markets in provincial regimes, however, did spur the growth 
of private energy capital, the largest  being TransAlta, based in Alberta. TransAlta claims 
control over 10,000 MW of coal, hydro and alternatives in Canada, the United States and 
Australia, giving it about twice the capacity of Manitoba Hydro.  Fortis, the owners of 
Newfoundland’s second largest utility, has also grown to become a major private utility 
holding company, owning major regulated distribution utilities in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, the provincial monopoly in Prince Edward Island (Maritime Electric), and 
through the 2004 purchase of Aquila Canada Networks, major distribution assets in 
Alberta (former TransAlta distribution system) and British Columbia (former West 
Kootenay Power).  Fortis also owns transmission and generation assets in New York, 
Belize and Grand Cayman.  Emera has taken a broader convergence expansion, owning 
Nova Scotia Power, a small hydro based utility in Maine, Sable Island Gas, regional 
pipelines and a regional heating fuel company.4  Most of Canada’s provincial utility 
sector has been, by definition, confined to provinces–and did not grow in league with the 
new energy system –save Hydro Quebec.  Hydro Quebec has invested in hydro and 
natural gas energy assets in the United States, Brazil and Latin America to become a 
major regional  player as well as the world’s third largest hydro producer.   
   Interprovincial as well as international trade barriers have decreased and trade 
is increasingly charcterized by short term market contacts rather than long term 
commitments.  In many cases, it is now difficult to use the term “provincial” utility at all.  
Even provincially owned generation companies, like BC Hydro, can become as 
committed to out of province regional markets as they are to traditional provincial 
markets. The new regime has also weakened Quebec Hydro’s monopsony powers over 
Churchill Falls Power.  As a result the Governments of Newfoundland and Labrador,  
Quebec and Ontario are negotiating the construction of an east-west grid to develop and 
transmit Labrador power to needy markets.  Also, Ontario and Manitoba have restarted 
negotiations about the development of Nelson hydroelectricity for Ontario Markets.  
Called, the Clean Energy Transfer Initiative, it differs from all previous concepts and 
negotiations in that it presupposes the establishment of an East-West Grid. 
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The Future: Canada-United States Policy Integration as a Policy Driver in the New 
Regime 
An important part of the postwar hydro policy centred on the economics of 
functional integration of cross border regions.  During the 1950s Ottawa worked with the 
US government and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec to make an agreement on Saint 
Lawrence River hydro development–in parcel with an emerging pact on the construction 
of an international Seaway system extending Canada’s inland ocean ports from Montréal 
to Lake Superior’s Thunder Bay.  Also, through IJC processes Ottawa coordinated the 
negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, and agreement whereby stabilization of the 
Columbia’s tributaries in Canada by means of dams and reservoirs allowed for greater 
power development in the lower Columbia and, eventually, the Peace River. (Swainson 
1979)  The IJC process also led to conservation regimes on the Saint John’s River and the 
sharing of the costs of New Brunswick’s diesel electric generating capacity with the state 
of Maine.   
The functional integration between Canada and the United States also tackled the 
problem of reliability.  In 1965 a major ice storm in Québec tripped a prolonged blackout 
throughout North Eastern North America.  Three years later, the United States response 
was to set up a voluntary non profit corporation, National Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC), to promote, educate, assess and monitor system reliability issues. To aid in this 
process, NERC set up a system of regional reliability councils through the United States, 
collections of systems that evolved into regional groups of cooperating utilities. Tese 
groups became institutional stepping stones for Canadian utilities seeking greater 
continental market and reliability integration.  
The NEB rose to become the central regulator of international electricity trade 
and international transmission facilities.  To ally the traditional nationalist concerns, NEB 
regulation confined exports to energy surplus to domestic needs and, as well, placed time 
limitations on export licences.  Thus, unlike the Canadian petroleum sector, Canadian 
electricity did not take an overall staples export structure.  Total exports to the US were 
less than seven percent of total Canadian production, and US exports only reached a 
quarter of one percent of US production. 
By the 1970s, electricity trade and interconnections in many provinces 
represented an equitable functional integration in which benefits were shared by all 
participants (Perlgit 1978). In the Maritimes, New Brunswick Hydro had one small 
interconnection with the state of Maine–and would continue agreements sharing capacity 
with interconnected US utilities for the period.  The Ontario network became functionally 
integrated with those of New York and Michigan as their interconnected grids saw power 
flow clockwise around Lakes Ontario and Erie.5  Ottawa did not allow Ontario to export 
nuclear-electricity and eventually placed an environmental charge on coal generated 
electricity exports.  
Slightly different trading relationships emerged in several of the large hydro-
electricity provinces. The proliferation of small international interconnections that 
characterized the formative paradigm in Quebec had been eliminated, and instead, Hydro 
Quebec built large capacity interconnections with the Power Authority of the State of 
New York (PASNY), exporting energy in a form of seasonal diversity exchange to offset 
costs of financing the James Bay development.6 Similarly, new international connections 
between Manitoba and Minnesota reflected a prebuild export strategy for energy flowing 
from Manitoba Hydro’s Nelson River power corridor. Though Manitoba’s export strategy 
was also based upon seasonal differences in energy demand with its US partners, early 
years of export saw great quantities of ‘surplus’ energy simply dumped on the export 
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market (Netherton 1993).  British Columbia developed several interconnections with 
Bonneville Power Authority (BPA), the US federally owned utility, itself based on the 
Ontario Hydro model, that was charged with developing the hydro potential of the 
Columbia.  Domestic opposition to a second large “ Site C” dam on the Peace River, 
stopped BC from fostering a pure staples export relationship with the US, although the 
provincial utility did become an effective opportunistic trader on the regional market.  
This pattern was to change, however with neoliberal trade and regulatory 
policies. After concluding the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the 
Canadian government established a new electricity policy in which National Energy 
Board export regulations were changed to conform to the terms of the new trade regime. 
The older security of supply and price protection regulations were replaced by concerns 
for third party effects, environmental standards and fair market access by other potential 
Canadian customers.  Though the NEB still would not regulate interprovincial electricity 
trade or interconnections, it signalled that it would consider objections from other 
provinces before agreeing to any new international power lines (Canada. Energy Mines 
and Resources Canada 1988). These provisions were a significant step in eroding 
provincial autarky and facilitating interprovincial integration because they constrained 
provinial autonmy and ensured that provincial utilities had to share their planning with 
others.   
The FTA did not open up floodgates of electricity trade between Canadian 
provincial and US utility networks because the US regime, unlike its Canadian 
counterpart, was much more fragmented and replete with domestic trade barriers. 
Historically, energy trade within the US was blocked because utilities were not obliged to 
“wheel” or transport a third party’s energy along its utility lines. Traditionally Canadian 
exporters had considered this wheeling problem as the major obstacle to developing long 
term diversity exchanges with southern US networks.  
In 1992, a new US Energy Policy emerged that was founded on the assumption 
of internal market failure; that the US had a great deal of electricity production capacity, 
but that it was inefficient and energy was not well distributed. In contrast to the Canadian 
case, the US federal government has expansive powers over interstate as well as 
international trade, and has a long history of using federal powers to macro manage the 
electrical energy sector. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the 
major federal energy authority. The new policy authorized FERC to embark upon a bold 
initiative to establish competitive markets for the supply, transmission and distribution of 
electricity throughout the United States.  The United States was to be organized into a set 
of Regional Trading Groups (RTGs), later named Regional Trading Orgnizations, or 
RTOs.  RTOs are defined as a “functioning voluntary organization (of transmission 
owners, transmission users and other entities approved by FERC) to efficiently 
coordinate transmission planning and expansion, operation, and use on a regional and 
inter-regional basis,” in other words, interconected regional electricity networks 
(National Energy Board 2005).  
 Four initial FERC regulatory orders and policies had significant extraterritorial 
impact on Canadian exporters. In 1996 FERC authored Order 888, commonly known as 
the “open access” or “reciprocity” provision.  This ordered utilities wanting to have 
access to US markets to allow access of US utilities to their markets.  Each utility could 
therefore outline a series of consistent market prices for the use of its transmission 
system.  These open access transmission tariffs (OATT) are the costs that the utility 
would charge others for wheeling (transporting) their energy.  The condition of open 
access meant a utility that wanted to trade in the US could not bar other utilities access to 
its own system.  
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Along with 888 was Order No. 889 demanding that the utilities had to use the 
same time sharing data system (creating a market for electricity depends giving 
instantaneous price signals using the advanced levels of information technology.) In 
1997, in response the wave of mergers and acquisitions that came with deregulation, 
FERC issued Order No 592, a policy that attempted to ensure that corporate mergers and 
restructuring did not thwart the intent to establish competitive markets.  Finally, in 
December 1999, FERC issued Order No. 2000, asking that all utilities wanting to trade in 
US markets to apply to join a RTO.  FERC could not directly apply this condition to 
Canadian utilities since they were not under its direct legal authority, although, 
interconnected Canadian utilities had to weigh costs of entry and exclusion.   
By 2000 several different models of the new energy regime had emerged in the 
United States, but the most symbolic new starts, such as California and its Enron-related 
energy debacle, were costly failures (Jaccard 2002; Woo, Lloyd and Tishler 2003). 
Energy policy debate  turned toward establishing a “standard market design” (SMD) that 
would guide utilities in forming the market rules within newly formed RTGs.  In July, 
2002, FERC issued a notification that it would make rules concerning a standard market 
design.  This was followed in 2003 with a white paper and a consultation process (FERC 
2003).  However, at time of writing, FERC has not finished this process and significant 
opposition to the FERC model has developed in the south as well in California.  
Predictably, all Canadian utilities with US interconnections were fairly quick, 
with some  regulatory challenges, to minimally meet FERC reciprocity demands by 
organizational restructuring and adoption of OATTs.7 However, at time of writing no 
Canadian utility had joined an RTO, though there has been western Canadian 
participation in RTO formation. In order to protect its regional market access, Manitoba 
worked out an “external participant” coordination agreement with the Midwest 
Independent System Operator, (MISO) a fully market based RTO.   British Columbia, as 
well, been involved in the negotiations concerning GridWest, the RTO for the Pacific 
Northwest–although no decisions have been made on the final form of the provincial 
participation.  Other western Canadian stakeholders are looking primarily for ways to 
increase the transmission infrastructure for electricity from Alberta through BC onto the 
California market.  Emera, the parent company of Nova Scotia Power, and  a minority 
participant in the New Brunswick and New England energy markets has expressed 
interests in greater New England - Maritime Provinces energy integration. Nova Scotia 
Power is now making minimal open access tariffs and is interested in a new jointly-
owned transmission line from  Nova Scotia through New Brunswick to Maine.  
The emergence of FERC as a supranational regulator also coincides with the 
increasing reliability problems associated with increased trade.  The issue came to a head 
with an August 2003 blackout, caused when a regional US electrical system experienced 
a set of problems that caused a series of cascading power failures, eventually putting 50 
million Canadian and Americans in the dark. A binational report into the incident 
recommends replacing NERC with a new Electrical Reliability Organization with the 
authority to enforce standards on utilities.  
 
Conclusions: The Quasi-Staples Status of Hydro-electricity and Post-Staples 
Analysis   
The “quasi-staples” status of hydro has to be reflected in any summation of its 
“post-staples” trajectory.  Staples analysis has always focussed on the creation and 
redistribution of economic rents, technological change, and trade issues.  Each of these 
features has been prominent in each of the three regimes of hydro-electricity described 
above.  
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In the formative period, the key rent-related issues were the distribution of rents 
to subsidize industrialization and urban electrification.  In the second, mature staples, 
period, rents were distributed through “cheap rates” to subsidize and facilitate the 
development of mass production and mass consumption.   In the third, post-staples, 
period rents and linkages are oriented towards sustainable development.  Hence ‘smart’ 
consumption has replaced ‘mass’ consumption and “demand side management” has 
replaced the “cheap power” policy.   
As far as technology is concerned, in the first period electricity was made with 
the most readably available resource–primarily, but not exclusively hydro.  The second 
period ushered in the era of ‘big’ technologies and projects, increasingly larger hydro 
projects, nuclear reactors and coal thermal plants–with all the attendant political, social 
and environmental agenda particular to each.  In the third period, we find that electrical 
energy regimes have far greater choice in technologies.  There are a series of benign 
and/or sustainable technologies that are and can be further developed for energy 
production; such as wind farms, photovoltaic and small scale hydro. Natural gas has also 
entered into the generation technologies with the efficient ‘combined cycle gas turbine.’ 
Current energy policy planners in Ontario, for example, have the choice between 
revamping older coal plants, buying new hydroelectricity from Labrador and Manitoba, 
reinvesting in a revamped nuclear technology and investing in natural gas combined 
cycle turbine technology.  
Trade networks have also changed.  In the first period fragmented set of networks 
had fixed borders—and the largest were  defined by urban regions. The utlities that 
controlled these networks competed to extend their control over relatively remote 
resources and urban populations. The lack of systemic integration of networks led to 
inefficiencies.  In the second period, networks were reorganized into provincial grids, and 
in a process fraught with contestation, provincial hydro networks extended their reach 
into northern peripheries. Long term international trade and limited interprovincial trade 
relations developed—all conditioned by an implicit assumptions of network self reliance. 
Currently, the nature of electricity grids began to change substantially. Increasingly 
proincial grids are being integrated into interconnected North American regional 
networks regulated by the US FERC. Additonally, due to a neoliberal reordering, 
electricity networks are more complex and also significantly more open. 8 
The third regime, however, is not yet stable. While advocates for change sought a 
neoliberal revolution, they ended up with an uncertain system of managed competition 
and increasingly transnational regional electricity grids.  Privatization has not generally 
taken place, and provincial governments are carefully seeking ways to legitimate the new 
regime.  Sustainable development interests began the paradigm with an implicit alliance 
with neoliberal forces, but have ended up somewhat disenchanted by new regime’s poor 
performance on the environmental issues. Aboriginal peoples are now invited to become 
partners in mega projects—though it is still uncertain what this new status will mean. The 
evolving regime is highly influenced by the supranational role the  US government has 
played in structuring continental markets. As a result, the politics of production are now 
more firmly linked with politics of consumption. Electrical energy policy is increasingly 
a North American game.  While this sector may not have been a ‘full’ staple in the past, it 
has shared the form and agenda of a mature staple, and more recently, as this regime has 
consolidated, a post staple. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                       
1 Thanks for the comments and suggestions from Michael Howlett, Keith 
Brownsey and the six anonymous reviewers who commented on this chapter. 
2 Indeed, as the work of Joy Parr illustrates, domestic technology, particularly in 
the kitchen, as the intersection of market, state and domestic sphere, took on an 
extraordinary importance in postwar culture and design, economic policy, utility business 
incomes and mass manufacturers (Parr 1996, 1999, 2002; Williams 1998).     
3 The provincial state rose to dominance over formerly private utility capital and 
of former municipal structures.  So important was the idea of the primacy of states over 
capital that the Government of Manitoba was able to successfully rewrite the terms of the 
Natural Resources Transfer Agreements so that it could unilaterally change the historical 
resource claims of capital–a move that would substantially aid the ideologically 
conservative Liberal-Progressive Government in its leverage to take over the Nebitt-
Thomson affiliate that dominated the provincial hydro sector, and also a quasi 
constitutional change that was justified in terms of provincial equality: if the Ontario 
Hydro-Electric Commission could use its power to break or change supply contracts as 
leverage to drive private and foreign capital out of the sector, then Manitoba could use 
powers to expropriate resource rights for the same purposes (Netherton 1993).  
4 One interesting development, from a staples perspective, is the growth of 
Cameco and Bruce Power.  During the mid 1990s the Harris government, effectively 
privatized Ontario Hydro’s oldest nuclear facilities in the Bruce Peninsula, called the 
Bruce Power Complex. Four of the installation’s eight reactors had been laid up by 
Ontario Hydro. The privatization took the form of a long-term lease to British firm, that 
for other reasons, shortly wanted out of its Canadian operations. The Canadian 
replacement was Bruce Power, a partnership between the Cameco, the Saskatchewan 
uranium supplier, Transcanada Pipelines and the two unions working at the Bruce 
Complex.  Privatization has been a success, with substantially greater efficiency and 
power production from operating units and refurbishment of two older installations.  
Over time Cameco has increased its ownership.  Cameco, therefore, emerges as both a 
staples supplier and  a high technology consumer of its own product. 
5 Additionally, there was a great deal of economy energy exchange with 
Michigan. Indeed, US auto interests worked out a set of US regulatory exceptions that 
allowed automakers unregulated access to Ontario electricity (Perlgut 1978).   
6 Though Quebec would eventually develop more hydro capacity than any other 
province, it has primarily been for domestic as opposed to export markets (Laundry 
1984).  
7 In a useful recent comparison of international electricity trade, Pierre-Olivier 
Pineau, Hira and Froschauer, indicate that Canada and the United States have the most 
integrated electricity markets in the world. Thought total Canadian exports vary, they do 
not exceed 9 percent of total generation while imports from the United States are less 
than one percent of US total generation.  The significant fact is that capacity of 
international interconnections is about 17% of total Canadian generation capacity, 
implying that short-term trade remains an integral part of managing Canadian energy 
supply. The overall picture emerges of a complex regional integration, not a staples 
export relationship, nor a profound market dependence (Pineau, Hira and Froschauer 
2004).   
8 Older command and control networks oriented towards the transmission and 
distribution of energy from large mega-projects is giving away to the idea of a more open 
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grid, where utility consumers can also, through distributed generation, supply energy to 
the grid.  
